Religion in Kurdistan

[Kurd Day]

رد: Religion in Kurdistan

Armenia and Georgia, perhaps 10,000 in Turkey, while only 5,000 are said to live in Syria.9
In Iraq there are two main geographical concentrations of Yezidis, in the Shaikhan district
north of Mosul where their most important sanctuary, the shrine of Shaikh Adi at Lalish, is
located, and on Mount Sinjar to the west of that city stretching into Syria. In the 1970s both
regions were subjected to Iraq's policy of arabisation. Numerous villages were evacuated, and
Arabs were later settled there. In Syria we find Yezidis not only in the Syrian part of Mount
Sinjar but also in the mountains north of Aleppo known as Kürt Dagı ("the Kurdish
Mountains"), as well as in a few villages in the upper Mesopotamian plain west of Qamishli.
Many of the Kurdish tribes here and in the contiguous part of Turkey used to be Yezidis but
have now become Muslims.
In the nineteenth century, Turkish censuses still recorded Yezidis as far north-west as
Sivas and in the Diyarbakir, Mardin and Siirt districts. Religious persecution has greatly
reduced their numbers. Many were killed, numerous others converted either to Christianity or
to Islam. Since the attitude of the Christian churches towards the Yezidis was more
benevolent than that of most Muslims, individual Yezidis preferred conversion to
Christianity. A fair number of the present West Syrian Christians are in all likelihood the
descendants of converted Yezidis. More recently the continued existence of the West Syrian
community itself has come under threat, making conversion to Islam a more secure
alternative.10 Severall tribes that were still reported to be in whole or in part Yezidis a century
ago, such as the Milli, the Berazi and the Hevêrkan, are now entirely Muslim — at least in
outward behaviour. The remaining Yezidis in Turkey live under great pressure of
discrimination if not persecution. Many have left for Germany as workers; since work permits
are no longer given, the remainder of the community is attempting to join them as refugees.11
In the Trans-caucasian republics the Yezidis have been relatively free of persecution. They
probably constitute the majority of the Kurds in both Armenia and Georgia. As a result the
studies of Kurdish folklore made by Soviet scholars concern specifically Yezidi folklore. In
9 John S. Guest, The Yezidis: A Study in Survival (London and New York: KPI, 1987), p. 197. Guest's estimate
of only 5,000 in Syria seems too low to me.
10 In 1975 I met a person in Idil (near Cizre) who had been born a Yezidi, had converted to Christianity at a
young age and had become a Muslim at a more recent date.
11 See Robin Schneider, ed., Die kurdischen Yezidi: Ein Volk auf dem Weg in den Untergang (Göttingen:
Gesellschaft für Bedrohte Völker, 1984).​

 

[Kurd Day]

رد: Religion in Kurdistan

the recent ethnic upheavals in Armenia, Muslim Kurds have been expelled (fleeing to Central
Asia), while the Yezidi Kurds were left in peace.
The Ahl-i-Haqq
The religion of the Ahl-i-Haqq ("Devotees of Truth") is also closely associated with
Kurdistan. It first emerged among the Guran of southern Kurdistan or in neighbouring
Luristan, and its most sacred writings are all in the Gurani language.12 Unlike the Yezidi
religion, however, it spread from Kurdistan to neighbouring areas and found followers among
the Lur, the Azerbaijani Turks, the Persians in Iran and the Turcomans in Iraq. The French
philosopher, the Comte de Gobineau, who spent several years in Iran in the mid-nineteenth
century, was the first westerner to write extensively on this religion, which he considered as
"the most important religion of Persia, be it for its dogmas, for the number of its adherents, or
for their quality."13
Among the Kurds the Ahl-i-Haqq religion has at present followers in four distinct areas.
The most important of these is the region west of Kirmanshah near the Iraqi border. This is
where the Guran live now and where we also find the major shrines of the Ahl-i-Haqq. A
second zone of concentration is the Sahne district between Kirmanshah and Hamadan. Many
of the Lur who live to the south of these two Kurdish Ahl-i-Haqq areas are also followers of
this religion, and it is quite possible that in the past a significant portion of the inhabitants of
the entire region were Ahl-i-Haqq. The third area consists of a string of Kurdish and
Turcoman villages south of Kirkuk in Iraq, where the religion and its followers are called
Kaka'i. The fourth consists of a cluster of villages near Mosul; this community goes by the
name of Sarli. I do not dare to make an estimate as to the number of Ahl-i-Haqq among the
Kurds. In the Guran district west of Kirmanshah, which I know best, they number in the tens
12 The Guran used to be a culturally distinct group among the Kurds, speaking a different language, Gurani.
Most of the present Guran no longer speak Gurani but southern Kurdish dialects; Gurani has, however, remained
the sacred language of the Ahl-i-Haqq, in which its most important religious texts are composed. See V.
Minorsky, "The Guran", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 11 (1943): 75-103; M. M. van
Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: On the Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan (dissertation,
Utrecht,1978), chapter II.1.
13 Comte de Gobineau, Trois ans en Asie (Paris: Grasset, 1923), vol. 2, p. 68.​

 

[Kurd Day]

رد: Religion in Kurdistan

of thousands. A recent study estimates the total number of all Ahl-i-Haqq at half a million,
but most of these are not Kurds.14
The Ahl-i-Haqq believe that God and six or seven archangels, who represent various
aspects of God's essence, have manifested themselves several times in the world in human
form. One of these human incarnations of God himself was, according to their belief, Ali, the
cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad. The belief in Ali's divine nature is shared
by a number of other Middle Eastern sects of extremist Shiite (ghulat) origin, such as the
Nusayris (Alawis) in Syria and the Qizilbash (Alevis) in Turkey. Their more orthodox
neighbours often lump these sects together under the nickname "Ali-Ilahis." To the Ahl-i-
Haqq, however God's most important incarnation was not Ali but Sultan Sahak, the reputed
founder of their sect. The Ahl-i Haqq also attach more importance than other ghulat sects to
the archangels accompanying the deity in all his manifestations, known together as the Haft
Tan, the Seven Persons. This resembles the Yezidi belief in seven angels who were incarnate
in seven saints; and it is of course reminiscent of the seven "Bounteous Immortals" (amesha
spenta), angelic beings who play a similar part in Zoroastrian doctrine. Like the Yezidis too,
the Ahl-i-Haqq believe in reincarnation of the ordinary human soul. Religious leadership is
hereditary and exercised by a number of sayyid families descending from Ahl-i-Haqq saints,
but there is not such an elaborate caste system as among the Yezidis.
Both sects emerged in a Muslim environment, as is clear from the names of their saints
and religious leaders as well as from many of the terms in which their religious ideas are
formulated. The Ahl-i-Haqq, however, appear to belong to the extremist Shia, whereas the
Yezidis may originally have been an extremist anti-Shia Muslim sect.15 Their similarities are
due to the pre-Islamic background that the share. Some of the Ahl-i-Haqq stress, like the
Yezidis again, that they are not Muslims but a separate religion, while others (among the
14 M. Reza Hamzeh'ee The Yaresan (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz,1990), p. 39. The author, a Kurdish Ahl-i-Haqq
himself, does not explain how he arrives at this estimate.
15 Some Yezidi leaders derive the name of their religion from that of the Umayyad Caliph Yazid b. Mu'awiya,
who was responsible for the violent death of Ali's son Husayn, the third Imam of the Shia. This derivation
appears to be corroborated by the fact that we find in various early sources references to a strongly pro-Umayyad
sect called Yazidis because of their sympathies for Yazid b. Mu`awiya. There is no evidence, however, as to
whether the present Yezidis are the descendants of their medieval namesakes. (See Fritz Meier "Der Name der
Yazidi's", in: Fritz Meier (ed.), Westöstliche Abhandlungen Rudolph Tschudi zum siebzigsten Geburtstag,
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1954). Others have claimed that the name is derived from the Iranian term Yazdan,
"spiritual being".​

 

[Kurd Day]

رد: Religion in Kurdistan

Kurds mainly those of the Sahne district) prefer to present themselves as an esoteric sect
within orthodox Shiism.
The Alevis (Qizilbash) of Turkish Kurdistan
The most numerous of the heterodox sects in Kurdistan are the Alevis, who live on the
north-western periphery of Kurdistan in an arc that stretches from Gaziantep to Bingöl and
who have as their major centre the Dersim district, which comprises the present province of
Tunceli and parts of Sivas Erzincan and Elazıg. The name Alevi is rather recent, and it is
used in Turkey for a number of groups of Ali-worshippers not directly interrelated. The
earlier name of Qizilbash given to these Kurdish as well as most Turkish Alevis has not yet
entirely gone out of use but is rejected by most of the people concerned because it has
become a term of abuse.
Qizilbash, literally "redheads," was originally the name given to the followers of the
messianic Shah Ismail, a charismatic mystic and warrior who believed in his own divinity and
who founded at the beginning of the l6th century the state that grew into modern Iran. Ismail
drew his following chiefly from among the poor and disaffected tribesmen (and perhaps also
peasants) in Asia Minor. The red headgear of some of his fighting forces gave the movement
its name. Their beliefs were probably a mixture of shamanism, extremist Shiism (both Ali
and Shah Ismail were considered as incarnations of God) and older Anatolian religions. Many
of Ismail's followers joined him in Iran, but numerous others stayed behind in Anatolia.
Several other Qizilbash rebellions followed, and all were bloodily quelled. The Qizilbash and
related sects suffered severe repression during the following centuries at the hands of both the
state, which always considered them as supporters of the enemy state of Iran, and their more
orthodox neighbors, who objected to their laxity in religious duties and accused them of
unspeakable sins, usually of a sexual nature. Persecution resulted in the Qizilbash's
withdrawal to inaccessible mountainous areas. Dersim in north-westem Kurdistan was one
such area.
In Iran the Shiite extremism of the Qizilbash gradually gave way to 'orthodox' (i.e., shari'abased)
Twelver Shiism under the influence of the Shiite ulama Shah Ismail invited from
southern Iraq, but there was no such development in Asia Minor. The Alevis of Turkey have
little in common with present-day Iranian Shiites. They do not perform the canonical five
daily prayers, do not make the pilgrimage to Mecca, and if they fast it is not in the month of​

 

[Kurd Day]

رد: Religion in Kurdistan

Ramadan but in Muharram, and only for three days. Their moral code is not based on the
Koran, and one of the striking facts about their religious rituals is that women also take part
in them — which is one of the reasons why they have often been accused of ritual
promiscuity. The Kurdish Qizilbash of Dersim were, if anything, even more heterodox than
other groups. There are vigorous remnants of nature worship (sun and moon, springs, rocks,
trees), while the gradual assimilation of many local Armenians to the Kurds here has also left
clear traces.
The secularising reforms in Atatürk's Republican Turkey were welcomed by the Alevis as
a liberation and first step in their social emancipation. Not surprisingly the Kurdish rebellion
of Shaikh Sa`id in 1925, with its strong Islamic overtones, was actively opposed by Kurdish
Alevi tribes in the region.16 This is not to say that Kurdish nationalism had made no inroads
among the Alevis (it had), but that the fear of Sunni fanaticism was much stronger than any
Kurdish national sentiment. Nationalist-inspired rebellions of Alevi Kurds (the first in 1920
involving only the Koçgiri tribe; the most important one later in 1937-38 involving large
parts of Dersim), conversely received no support from Sunni Kurds. The Alevi Kurds were at
most times much closer to Turkish Alevis than to the Sunni Kurds.
When Turkey's politics gradually polarised from the 1960s on, the Alevis, and especially
the Alevi Kurds tended to end up at the left end of the political spectrum. The old Sunni-
Alevi antagonism was exacerbated by political rivalries between the left and the (religious
and Turkish nationalist) right. Political agitation during the 1970s resulted in numerous
violent clashes between Sunnis and Alevis, culminating in the riots of Kahramanmaras in
1978, in which more than a hundred Alevis were killed by right-wing Sunni mobs. The
military regime that took over in September 1980 attempted to deflate the tension between
Sunnis and Alevis by organising reconciliation ceremonies and suppressing communal
friction. The differences between Sunnis and Alevis were played down, and many Alevis
complained of attempts at assimilation through building mosques and appointing Sunni
imams to Alevi villages.
The suppression of Alevi identity was strongest in the Tunceli area. Since the Dersim
rebellion of 1937-38, the government had always looked upon this province as the most
unruly part of the country, not only Alevi but also a hotbed of Kurdish nationalism and later
16 On this rebellion and the role of religion as a factor motivating participants and opponents, see my "Von
Osmanismus zum Separatismus.", pp. 244-257.​

 

[Kurd Day]

رد: Religion in Kurdistan

left-wing sympathies. Radical left parties and organisations, both Turkish and Kurdish, drew
strong support here. Tunceli was one of the major targets of the military operations to restore
law and order after the 1980 coup, and it has remained heavily policed ever since.
Nevertheless, violent protest actions continued there, carried out by supporters of Partizan (a
Turkey-wide radical left organisation whose members are almost exclusively of Alevi
background) and the Kurdish PKK (Workers' Party of Kurdistan). The government
announced plans to evacuate most Tunceli villages and resettle the inhabitants in various
other provinces, ostensibly for reasons of reforestation, but most probably in order to break
the spirit of resistance.
Around 1990 we see another change in government policy toward the Alevis. Neglect
gives way to official recognition of Alevism as a variant of Islam in its own right. The annual
celebrations for the great Alevi saint Haji Bektash, which in previous decades turned into an
oppositional cultural festival suddenly received official sponsorship. Alevi culture receives
praise for its richness, the press is full of long and favourable reports on Alevi history, Alevi
traditions, Alevi spirituality, the Alevi background of Turkish literary works, etc. In one year
more books were published on the Alevis than in all of the preceding half century. This
reflects, but also stimulates, a search among young Alevis for their roots and a new pride in
their religious identity. The Alevi revival is at least in part stimulated from above. As
government critics see it, it serves a number of related purposes simultaneously. A renewed
interest in the cultural and spiritual dimension of Alevism may lead Alevi youth away from
leftist radicalism, and the Alevis may be used as a barrier against the rise of politicised Sunni
Islam ("fundamentalism"), while the new emphasis on the Alevi identity may weaken the
radical Kurdish movement, in which Alevi Kurds had been disproportionately represented.
The Sunni Majority — The Role of the Mystical Orders
The saying about the Kurds being poor Muslims with which I opened this article is belied
by the fact that they have produced a large number of great Islamic scholars who had an
influence well beyond the boundaries of Kurdistan. During the past six centuries, Kurdish
ulama could be found in influential positions at the Ottoman court and as teachers at the
famous university of al-Azhar or in the Holy Cities of Arabia. Geographical accident had
placed the Kurds between the three major cultural regions of Islam, and many Kurdish ulama
knew Persian and Turkish as well as Arabic and, of course, Kurdish. This gave them an​